Our common vocabulary contains words that are rarely heard to the west of us: words
such as sovereignty, independence, freedom, God, homeland, family, work, honor,
security, and common sense.”
That was Viktor Orbán talking back in 2018, as he described the shared ideology of
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. As the Visegrad Four, they were a
bloc within a bloc, the tail that often wagged the EU dog, projecting themselves as
defenders of national sovereignty, cultural conservatism, and resistance to Brussels’
authority. Their united opposition to EU refugee-quota plans forced Brussels to retreat
from compulsory relocation and helped shift the entire migration debate toward border
control.
Now, the four countries’ leaders are preparing to meet on the group’s future at a time
when little remains common among them beyond a shared geography.
Slovak Premier Robert Fico remains the only Eurosceptic in office. Orbán, the founder of
“illiberal democracy,” was replaced last month by the pro-EU Peter Magyar. Donald
Tusk, a fellow Europhile, has set policy in Warsaw since late 2023. Andrej Babiš of the
Czech Republic often aligned rhetorically with the group’s anti-migration, anti-Brussels
posture. But he’s a pragmatist rather than a true Brussels critic. As such, he is unlikely to
stand with a weakened Fico to oppose the EU’s security and economic policies.
So is the Visegrad Four dead? Or will it rise from its nationalist-populist ashes in its
original iteration as a regional group focused on practical cooperation?
Before becoming a rightwing political force, the V4 functioned mainly as a technical
coordination platform harmonizing trade rules, improving crossborder transport links,
modernizing waterway corridors, and presenting joint positions on EU funding. The stars
are aligning for the bloc to again focus on just that as a practical, Central European
coordination forum rather than a geopolitical counterproject.
If so, the EU will only benefit. European Council meetings will be quieter with Orbán
gone. More importantly, EU support for Ukraine can move ahead on longterm financial
support, joint defense procurement, and other military projects.
Longer term, the group’s return to pragmatism would again contribute to common goals.
A proEU Hungary, a firmly mainstream Poland, and a transactional Czech Republic
would turn the V4 from a political veto machine back into what it was formed for: a
regional partner that contributes input to EU priorities rather than fighting them.
Just in time, too. With a bellicose Great Power at its borders, another turned from
partner to rival, and the victim of economic warfare from the third, the EU needs to focus
on outside threats instead of fighting an enemy from within.
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